



ENLIGHTEN Extended Public Summary

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“European Legitimacy in Governing through Hard Times” (#649456-ENLIGHTEN).

1. The Project’s Concept, Objectives and Social Relevance

Since the Global Financial Crisis, the European Union has faced a series of economic and legal crises, including on issues such as banking, taxation, unemployment, austerity cuts, and competition over the rule of law. These entrenched and interdependent issues have pushed the limits of existing European modes of governance and called into question the legitimacy of the European project. The EU and its agencies have responded by innovating in their use of governance programs and tools, as well as restructuring existing policy instruments and coordination mechanisms. All of this activity has been propelled by the question of “More Europe? – Less Europe?”, a key question for European societies and for the European project overall.

The ‘European Legitimacy in Governing through Hard Times: the role of European Networks’ (ENLIGHTEN) project was tasked with offering an answer to this question by providing original research on issues that are straining the European project. The ENLIGHTEN consortium was unique in having a balance between university academics and frontline NGO expertise. The team included researchers from the Copenhagen Business School, the University of Amsterdam, the Université libre de Bruxelles, the Central European University, as well as Finance Watch, Housing Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation, and Tax Justice Network. The team worked together in focusing on a series of cases through the lens of how different modes of governance are legitimated, and through the concept of fast- and slow-burning crises that was developed and applied throughout the life of the project.

ENLIGHTEN distinguishes between Europe’s ‘fast-burning’ and ‘slow-burning’ crises and is comparing the ways in which EU policy actors have attempted to deal with them. The distinction between fast- and slow-burning crises is straightforward. We immediately identify fast-burning crises because of their volatility and the attention they draw. Fast-burning crises attract a lot of oxygen and energy, and the pace of burning is high while policy or social attention provides fuel to the flames. The intensity can reinforce the tempo. They are the crises that are most obvious to us, such as the recent banking crisis, the austerity programmes or the youth unemployment and intra-European migration crises (the specific topics of ENLIGHTEN research in the fast-burning category). Fast-burning crises are moments and ongoing events characterised by alarm and an urgent demand for political action. Fast-burning crises throw European institutions and their functions into sharp relief, bringing to the fore political, social and economic interests to fight over how immediate problems should be addressed in the now. Fast-burning crises increase frustrations with the EU’s governance architecture, raising questions about structural reform from politicians, policy elites, the media, and the general public.

Slow-burning crises produce less heat but nevertheless burn away as long as there is sufficient interest in them. What ENLIGHTEN researchers term a ‘slow-burning’ crisis is critical for differentiating what kinds of EU governance architecture and associated modes of governance enhance the legitimacy of the European project. Slow-burning crises extend beyond normal political and business cycles. These crises are more ‘normal’ in how they are considered by the public: no immediate action is needed but expectations about how to live are changing. They include issues such as financial sustainability, public services provision, and the political and socio-economic consequences of demographic change (the specific topics in ENLIGHTEN research in the slow-burning category). On issues that are less politically visible the key point of contestation is what constitutes good science in addressing the issue at hand.

Following this separation of fast- and slow-burning crises, the ENLIGHTEN project has targeted the following objectives:

- To MAP how European institutions and expert networks handle fast- and slow-burning crises. In particular we sought to: identify the pivotal players in the policy processes during fast- and slow-burning crises; to compare the diagnoses and solutions to crises; and trace how they shaped policy.
- To DIFFERENTIATE the key players in fast- and slow-burning crises; whether policy insiders were more active on particular issues than others; and what modes of governance are effective in addressing crises.
- To ARTICULATE the best way to: find effective *and* legitimate policy solutions; reconcile diversity and flexibility with European governance processes; and identify what forms of governance are politically acceptable and administratively feasible.

These objectives were met through a series of case studies from contested policy fields. The three policy fields were: (1) Banking Crises and Fiscal Sustainability; (2) Deficit Reduction and Continuity of Public Services; and (3) Youth Employment and Inclusive Growth.

The ENLIGHTEN research team investigated changes in European modes of governance across fast- and slow-burning crises in the above policy fields, specifying fast- and slow dynamics in each case. For example, the team working on banking crises and fiscal sustainability developed individual streams of new research on regulatory dilemmas in financial regulation, macroeconomic imbalances procedures, expert networks on shadow banking, and initiatives to change corporate taxation rules in the EU. These streams then contributed to a team discussion about financial sustainability in Europe and concrete policy recommendations that are produced below. The team working on deficit reduction and public services split into teams working on comparative national cases of reforms to health systems and, separately, housing systems. These streams then contributed to a discussion on changing ideas about public service provision, austerity, and financialization. The team working on youth employment and inclusive growth divided into individual streams on intra-European labour mobility, on unemployment policy tools, and on expert networks on demographic change issues. This contributed to a discussion about how fast-burning employment crises are linked to family formation and ageing issues across Europe. As with other streams of research in the project, this led to policy recommendations that are noted below.

Research in ENLIGHTEN has been important for European society because the framework and subsequent research focuses attention not only on how European authorities have dealt with crises, but also the experience of European citizens. Identifying how authorities diagnose and treat crisis issues, and how European citizens experience them is important to identify where communication can improve between the two and support the legitimacy of European integration efforts.

2. Work performed in the project

The key task for researchers in the ENLIGHTEN project was to develop original conceptual and empirical research material to understand how fast- and slow-burning crises are governed in Europe. The organisation of work was separated into the following Work Packages:

WP1: Legitimacy of European Modes of Governance
WP2: Banking Crises and Fiscal Sustainability
WP3: Deficit Reduction and Continuity of Public Services
WP4: Youth Employment and Inclusive Growth
WP5: Impact: Policy and Public Outreach and Training
WP6: Project Management

The findings of the various Work Packages are as follows.

WP1: Legitimacy of European Modes of Governance

Work in WP1 focused on conceptual and theoretical development, exploring the concepts of fast- and slow-burning crises, as well as different forms of legitimacy in European modes of governance. The distinction between fast and slow—burning crises by Seabrooke and Tsingou (2018) has already been clarified in the section above, so here we focus on other developments in WP1.

WP1 researchers also provided a new conceptualisation of ideas as resources of power in the post-crisis European Union governance. Power in this regard can be thought of as *power through ideas* as a capacity of actors to persuade others about the cognitive validity and/or normative value through the use of ideational elements; *power over ideas* as the capacity to control and dominate the meaning of ideas; and *power in ideas* as the authority to institutionalize certain ideas at the expense of others. As Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) have demonstrated, this distinction is helpful to understand the actions of institutional agents and member states during the Eurocrisis, and it highlights legitimacy consequences associated with the use of the respective power dimensions of ideas.

The distinction between slow- and fast-burning crises further provides a valuable tool to explain changes in power relations between and within institutions, including a move from a discourse of conviction towards a discourse of persuasion. This concept was understood from the point of view of the authorities and social actors involved, dealing with how they make sense of how crises change in time (as in the Seabrooke and Tsingou framework), as well as through researchers' identification of the different crisis tempos. This has been demonstrated by Coman (2018). As the crisis entered a slow-burning phase from 2012 onwards, flexibility has been introduced through the implementation process (*throughput legitimacy*). On the other hand, at the onset of the fast-burning crisis (2010-2012), conditionality mechanisms within the European Semester have accelerated some of the evolutions already unfolding since the Maastricht treaty.

The research has highlighted the reignition of the classic debate on the potentialities and risk of Crisis for European integration with the inter-governmentalists stressing the coercive power of dominant member states in the Council, and supra-nationalists highlighting the use of institutional power by supranational actors such as the EC and/or the ECB. The main argument is that the euro crisis is best understood as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional and ideational power that favoured different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast-burning phase (2010-2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the Council was strongest, to the slow-burning phase (2012-2016), when greater influence was afforded to supranational actors through the use of ideational institutional power.

To understand the shifting relations between EU institutions during the crises, WP1 researchers produced a **typology of power** as exerted *within* the EU institutions. It distinguishes between **coercive, institutional and ideational power**.

Coercive power is defined as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another where these relations allow one actor to shape directly the circumstances or action of another. It can be based on exogenous factors such as material resources (economic strength) or voting rights. On the other hand, endogenous resources include asymmetrical interdependence, credible threats to veto or exit, side-payments and issue-linkage, and lastly alternative coalitions.

Institutional power is defined as one actor's control of others through the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B. It is exercised through formal and informal agenda setting power, discretion in interpretation, implementation oversight and enforcement of policy. Technical capacity and expertise play a crucial role in this process.

Lastly, *ideational power* – defined as the capacity of actors to influence other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements (persuasion, domination and/or institutionalisation) – can be exercised utilizing various resources. These include leadership capacity, rhetorical skill, professional authority, expertise, democratic legitimacy, the ability to convince through cognitive/normative argument, and the ability to compel or disregard ideas or to embed these in rules and institutions.

Based on the question of how EU institutional actors have sought to 'douse' the flames of the Eurozone crisis, this research contributes to existing literature by showing how new/old principles of governance have (re)shaped modes of governance. Key dimensions in explaining this process are flexibility, conditionality and ownership. The reformed governance of the EU has witnessed consolidation with regards to acceptable inputs and outputs. Over time, flexibility has been introduced through the implementation (throughput) process. Additionally, the introduction of conditionality mechanisms has accelerated some of the evolutions already unfolding since the Maastricht Treaty. These have been described in different ways by researchers working on 'new intergovernmentalism' and the 'new supranationalism'. These new governance processes have faced legitimacy challenges mainly on the notion of ownership. This raises the question of parliamentary input and oversight. Increasing awareness/politicisation has led to new forms of European and National parliamentarism.

WP1 traces these various governance processes through a series of cases, focusing on the politics of the European Semester process, the framing of post-crisis reform ideas from European authorities, and mapping changes among expert networks in Brussels think tanks. This research led to a series of policy recommendations that are noted below.

WP2: Banking Crises and Fiscal Sustainability

WP2 in the ENLIGHTEN project investigated financial sustainability in the European Union, divided into four dimensions: (1) the European Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) to address unsustainable public finances and related macroeconomic challenges, (2) financial regulation, with an eye to promoting financial stability, (3) European tax policy, with regard to potential erosion of tax bases, and (4) expert networks in central banking and the relationship between expertise and European modes of governance.

The overall approach of this work has conceptualised financial sustainability as embedded in fiscal policy/recovery, financial regulation, taxation, and monitoring. It concluded that the current recovery model has social and political costs, threatening the viability of the EU structure (e.g. the extra-treaty status of the European Stability Mechanism). Further, the authority of financial institutions can – paradoxically – hamper institutional learning between international economic organisations, like the International Monetary Fund, and national and supranational institutions like the European Central Bank. Lastly, the research highlights the threat of shadow banking to long-term financial sustainability in Europe and the strength of expert networks in international and European institutions dealing with the growth of non-conventional financial intermediation and financial innovation (Ban et al. 2016).

To address the intertwined challenges of legal status, institutional complexity and shadow banking, the research highlights a need for dynamic regulation based on the inclusion of a broader range of policy actors and a generally lower finance-dependence. Market reflexivity invites for drastic reforms, but also obstructs them at the same time. On taxation, attracting foreign capital by means of favourable taxation rules and regulations can prove unsustainable in the long-term, mirroring negative externalities of the resource-curse such as unequal growth, crowding out, and emphasis on tax-competition. This phenomenon has been labelled the *finance curse*, a concept developed in the project through collaboration between an academic and NGO partner. The downsides of the finance curse include high negative externalities in other social/political domains, for example through highly unequal growth, the crowding out of other productive economic sectors, and an ultimately self-defeating tax-race to the bottom. The potential for Britain to be constrained by this curse post-Brexit has been heightened (Christensen, Shaxson and Wigan, 2016)

European to national comparisons were also provided. Through a study on the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) in five countries (BE, NL, D, FR, IT), it has been argued that the imposition of MIPs and the corresponding Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) can be counterproductive, which undermines the productive potential of the instrument in "moving the needle" in national policy debates. Especially the "wicked" policy problems (e.g. German trade surplus or the Dutch housing market) demand policy dialogue to be effective rather than a singular vision. In its practical implementation, the MIP is less coercive than critics claim but also less effective than its champions hope. The MIP does not achieve, and arguably does not intend, policy change at the national level against firm domestic opposition of member states. This more nuanced effect of the MIP is attributable not only to such opposition, however, but also to the intellectual openness of the substantive questions.

Research in WP2 also found that financial sector reforms to banish financial market vulnerability have been limited. This limited progress, however, is not necessarily an effect of regulatory mistakes or negligence. Instead, we diagnose fundamental limits to governing inherently unstable markets. Policymakers and members of civil society overestimate the ability of regulation to banish financial instability by itself in an adverse macroeconomic context (low growth, ultra-low interest rates). Because a permanent regulatory fix is elusive, we need more dynamic regulation – which can correct its own unintended effects – and a lower exposure of society and citizens on the inevitable gyrations of financial markets (Stellinga and Mügge 2017). At the same time, policy stances are not immutable, and both societal pressure and expert debate can mould governments' position. In particular, WP2 research found that initiatives such as the Tax Justice Network have been able to effect significant reform, for example by pushing for Country-by-Country reporting (Seabrooke and Wigan 2016). WP2 produced a long list of policy recommendations that are noted below.

WP3: Deficit Reduction and Continuity of Public Services

Research in WP3 focused on how austerity cuts compound existing challenges in European Union members states in the areas of public health and housing provision. Traditionally, the provision of universal and affordable health care and affordable housing have been corner stones of European welfare states. Today, both are perceived by social actors to be in deep crisis. The research addressed the role of EU institutional actors in shaping national reforms and asks, how actors have sought to integrate legitimacy concerns in the development of unpopular reforms.

Despite extensive crisis management, in both healthcare and housing, the crises have not been solved. To the contrary, the perception of housing accessibility and affordability is that it has morphed from a fast-burning into a slow-burning crisis, with prices escalating due to financialisation while social housing remains stagnant or in decline. Healthcare is perceived as being in a permanent slow-burning crisis, where public provisions are being dwindled back or restricted. While legitimisation strategies might be able to bridge the tension between fiscal responsibility and popular responsiveness for some time, the tension remains generally unresolved. Especially in housing, the crisis has generated unintended consequences, exemplified by a (involuntary) shift towards a patrimonial system, where the provision of housing is becoming much more a matter for the family rather than the state.

WP3 research investigated national experiences, focusing on the British, Danish, Irish, French, and Hungarian cases. Since housing and health care still are primarily addressed by national governments, the chosen legitimisation strategies differ considerably, mirroring the varieties of residential capitalism among EU member states. However, efficiency is the most important frame for countries under difficult fiscal conditions. Throughput legitimacy is generally used in an instrumental way: governments refer to those actors that they deemed potentially crucial allies or veto players whose consent was needed in reform processes.

The findings from the research on health were that while most countries under investigation imposed funding cuts on their health care systems, countries relied to different degrees on organisational reforms, a mixture of centralisation and decentralisation, marketisation and expansion of health care coverage. In all cases, policy makers used a mixture of frames to legitimate reforms. They stressed the need to act financially responsible, and built their reforms on input from professionals and civil society actors. Policy makers also used a mixture of input, output and throughput legitimacy. The most important frame for input legitimacy was social justice. The stress on equal access to healthcare continues to be an important legitimisation strategy for policy makers. In terms of output legitimacy, financial stability and cost efficiency have been stressed by policy makers in the two countries that were under heavy financial constraints (Ireland and Hungary), while in the UK and France more stress was put on the improvement of healthcare quality. Throughput legitimacy, finally, was mostly used in an instrumental way, meaning that governments were referring to those actors that they deemed potentially crucial allies or veto players whose consent was needed in the reform process (Crespy and Szabo 2017).

On housing research, WP3 researchers found that because of a policy paradigm shift towards housing as asset since the 1980s, housing has become increasingly embroiled in financial markets. After the crisis it was very difficult to undo this financial market entanglement of housing. Housing policies have often become subordinated to policies targeting financial market stability. Because of this, there is a mismatch between housing needs and policies. A second finding is that this state weakness has ushered in (partly by default, partly by design) a much greater reliance on family resources for coping with housing issues. In all three countries the work package analysed (Hungary, Ireland, and Denmark), it is

exceedingly difficult for young generations to get access to housing unless they get substantial help from their families (Bohle and Seabrooke 2017).

The overall findings for WP3 can be summarised as follows: In both healthcare and housing, the crises have not been solved. Rather, housing has morphed from a fast into a slow-burning crisis, while healthcare is in a stage of permanent slow-burning crisis. Unless there is a policy change at national and European levels away from fiscal discipline towards public investment and away from monetary policies that compensate for the absence of fiscal policies through quantitative easing, these crises will remain and contribute to the legitimacy deficit of national governments and the European Union as a whole. Policy recommendations follow from these findings and are noted below.

WP4: Youth Employment and Inclusive Growth

Work package 4 focused on 'Youth Employment and Inclusive Growth', which concentrated specifically on policy tools for addressing unemployment, intra-European Union migration, and expert networks on demographic change. These are obviously important issues and capture intra-European dynamics of fast-burning crises through the immediate need to deal with issues such as youth unemployment, as well as slow-burning issues such as intra-European migration, the perception of 'brain drain' in Europe as a problem, and ageing and family formation concerns.

WP4 researchers took stock of key developments in employment policy since the crisis, highlighting the new dimensions of Social Europe, and looked into the development of the Youth Guarantee and its different components. Research then turns to examining the job search strategies and labour market outcomes of recent youth migrants, using a special module on migrants of the European Labour Force Survey (2014), and with an emphasis on Central and Eastern European migrants in EU15 member states. The work found that social networks are crucial for finding employment, but that there is a mismatch between job content and (subjectively assessed) qualifications, and also effects on earnings (Leschke and Weiss 2017).

Further WP4 examined how active labour market policies (training and relocation) and passive labour market policies (unemployment benefits) affect outcomes for natives and migrants. The investigation provided an analysis of the effects on policies on natives and migrants but also among different types of migrants (EU and third country), and drew on new data from the European Labour Force Survey and data on labour market policy spending in 29 European countries (1998-2015). The key findings from this study are that policy tools for unemployment work for natives and EU migrants, however, not for migrants from third countries, and that the unemployment gap between natives and EU migrants and other migrants is also based on a policy effectiveness gap. (Schaper and Burgoon 2018).

For intra-EU migration, 'brain drain' has become a political problem primarily in member states of the former Eastern bloc, and for the younger cohorts, in crisis-hit southern Europe. This work established a hand-coded dataset of parliamentary questions and is additionally based on twenty-seven interviews with key policy actors (Commission staff, think tanks, trade unions, employer organisations). The analysis reveals that the uncertainty, controversy, and open-endedness of brain drain as an intra-European phenomenon lends itself well to multiple framings by actors in pursuit of preconceived political ends. This creates a space of opportunities within the Commission between laissez-faire and interventionist responses that vary in terms of the economic assumptions and political preferences brought to bear on the issue (Hasselbalch 2017). The current approach is weighted in favour of the supply side argument and an employability logic.

The same dynamic was observed in WP4 research on expert networks on the issue of demographic change in Europe. The competing frames of laissez-faire and interventionist policies are represented within the Commission by DG ECFIN and EMPL. Internal Commission dynamics mean that DG EMPL is the lead actor on expert involvement on demographic change issue, but that DG ECFIN has an advantage in framing potential policy choices in market rather than interventionist terms to the Commission. Outside expertise comes primarily from an academic community with little NGO involvement and almost no private sector involvement (Seabrooke, Tsingou and Willers 2018). WP4 research also led to policy recommendations that are noted below.

WP5: Impact: Policy and Public Outreach and Training

In WP5 the Impact team were tasked with providing information to the public, to stakeholders, and hosting events for public debate. Important here was the use of fora conceived of as participative exercises; Associating Governmental Organisations, Researchers and Advocacy (AGORA) events are rooted in the substantive collaboration between the project's 4 Academic and 4 non-Academic partners. Following the AGORA model for policy engagement, the key events in the project were as follows: :

- Instigation AGORA in June 2015: “Are Hard Times the Mother of Invention? Enlightening European Responses to Fast and Slow Burning Crises”
- Dissemination AGORA in October 2017: “Learning the lessons from the fast-burning crisis & challenging the policy blind spots feeding the slow-burning crises.”
- One additional AGORA was hosted in Boston (USA) in collaboration with both Boston University & Harvard (April 2016) under the headline “Are Hard Times the Mother of Invention? Efficiency & Legitimacy of Crisis-born European Modes of Governance”. It allowed an additional Sponsored Delegation at the Conference for European Studies in Philadelphia and involved seven ENLIGHTEN affiliated researchers and staff members from WP1 and WP5.
- Summer School in 19 – 23 September 2016. This provided training from ENLIGHTEN researchers to Early Career Researchers interested in European governance issues.
- Network conference - 22-23 May 2017. Which brought together ENLIGHTEN researchers with six other European funded research projects as well as policymakers and NGO stakeholders to discuss ENLIGHTEN research findings and policy implications.
- At the request of the EC Project Officer, an additional closing event was co-organized with H2020 project TransCrisis, and hosted in Brussels: “Crises in the European Union: An ENLIGHTEN-TransCrisis policy debate”.
- An ENLIGHTEN “Mini-symposium” was hosted in Chicago at the 2018 Conference for European Studies. It involved 11 ENLIGHTEN affiliated Researchers from across all 5 research work packages.

The WP5 team also successfully had a collaboration with the Council for European Studies, which has led to a documentary film “Resilience” that was released on the ENLIGHTEN home page and YouTube. The project website - <http://enlightenproject.eu/> provides extensive content on the ENLIGHTEN project, as well as public access to our think pieces and publications. This include the production of policy briefs that that WP5 was responsible for.

WP6: Project Management

WP6, based at the Copenhagen Business School, managed the project. ENLIGHTEN is a unique project in having an equal mix of academic and NGO partners (four of each), creating a project that integrated policy and social agendas directly into the research. Because the team was small in number the coordination and management role was straightforward, with WP6 duties essentially to ensure that partners in the consortium were aware of their responsibilities, and that WP leaders informed their research teams about ethical and data management protocols.

Exploitable Results

From the findings described above ENLIGHTEN researchers produced sixteen policy recommendations derived from our original research. They are presented here and follow the logic of the Work Packages described above.

Greater Legitimacy for the European Semester

1. The European Semester process has strengthened the powers of executives at the expense of the legislatives.
The EP has to have real power in the coordination of macroeconomic policies.
2. The **European Semester needs increased transparency and publicity.** Recent institutional changes in order to strengthen its input, output and throughput legitimacy have strengthened the powers of the Commission and member states. While from a bureaucratic/administrative point of view solutions have been found for

past shortcomings, little has been done to increase its publicity/transparency. Discussions about the degree of convergence and divergence in terms of socioeconomic policies should take place at the EU level before the publication by the Commission of the AGS (Annual Growth Surveys).

3. **Increased politicization:** Not only social partners and political actors should play a greater role in explaining the issues at stake in the coordination of macroeconomic policies, but also journalists and observers should be more proactive in bringing into attention the degree of convergence and divergence between EU member states.
4. Policymakers could address public perception of longer-term slow-burning issues by encouraging different actors to **provide alternative frames**. Without frames, it is difficult to legitimate – or even cognitively prioritize – programmes to face them. And without that, the concern is that neglecting these issues (e.g. demographic change) will change experience so much that expectations about who can solve these issues will empower right-wing anti-EU parties.

Boosting Financial Sustainability

5. Financial sustainability is the result of an integrative mix of a sustainable growth model, long-term financial stability, sustainable public finances based on a move away from tax-competition, and the possibility of long-term flexibility for member states to choose their economic path.
6. A blurring of the European legal order has consequences for the legitimacy of the entire euro governance structure. This is most clearly visible with the European Stability Mechanism.
7. Combatting tax avoidance and the promotion of competitiveness are complementary rather than opposing goals.
8. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure needs to be politicized. At the moment, the procedure is too technocratic to reach a wider audience. There is often a general sense that “Brussels” is focused on government budgets and structural reforms, but that is not mirrored in a more nuanced understanding of the actual functioning of the MIP.
9. Addressing immediate fiscal imbalances through budget cuts can sow the seeds of future imbalances that are more structural in nature. This is illustrated by the findings that in the early cycles of the European Semester Member States were often advised to safeguard public investment and increase education quality, but such calls were simply overridden by the recommendation to bring the budget back to sustainability.
10. European financial supervision needs to ensure knowledge sharing with key international economic organizations to be informed and updated on risks from non-conventional financial institutions and the growth of shadow banking.

Maintaining Health and Social Housing

11. Health. European economic monitoring should permit **greater fiscal space for the maintenance of health care systems**, which are under greater pressures in countries under greater oversight and scrutiny.
12. Housing. Concerns with the decline of social housing in many European countries should be addressed with **greater European level monitoring of the relationship between trends in private housing access and the quality of social housing**.
13. Housing and Health care remain important slow-burning crises that directly affect European citizens. At the same time, Programmes from EU institutions address these issues poorly. As long as citizens do not feel that frames are actively developed to address these issues, there grows a danger of right and left wing anti-EU populists to claim to address is-sues with high public valence but low political salience.
14. National governments remain the most important actors, but financial regulation directly affects national housing markets.

Addressing Migratory Employment and Family Formation Issues

15. Active Labour Market Policies: Tools aimed at migrants who experience unemployment are not hitting their targets. The unemployment gap between natives and EU migrants and other migrants is also based on a policy effectiveness gap.
16. Demographic Change. The European Commission should re-establish an in-house task force on population issues that also integrates key European stakeholders in the public and civil society sector, but also business. The creation of a genuine policy dialogue between market-led and more policy interventionist views on demographic change is needed in a public setting.

Referenced ENLIGHTEN Research – available from www.enlightenproject.eu

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3. Progress beyond the state of the art and potential social impacts

ENLIGHTEN research went beyond the state of the art in European studies in political science and sociology, especially in explicitly discussing the relationship between power and ideas, the temporal dimension of crisis dynamics according to sensemaking perceptions and periodization, and with methodological innovations in the combination not only of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, but the integration of computational methods such as content, network, and sequence analyses.

Our work challenges and advances European Studies and Welfare Studies by questioning how European modes of governance are changing how crises are being handled in national systems, as well as the new tendency for authorities to monitor and report on economic and social change within Europe. Our research on expert networks applied novel methods to uncover which actors are important in framing how problems should be treated, and indeed what issues deserve most attention. Naturally our scholarly impact will follow the publication of ENLIGHTEN's research, of which the bulk is now in the public domain. The Monitors at the final review of the project noted that the ENLIGHTEN project had had remarkable academic success and was already influential in European studies.

Beyond the academic state of the art, we have been positively surprised in how quickly the language of "fast- and slow-burning crises" has been adopted in our discussions with members of the European Commission, the European Parliament, external stakeholders, and even from our research subjects. On societal impact, our original research and range of policy recommendations provide a strong contribution to the European policy debate.